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Toward an Integrative Understanding of the
Processes Distinguishing Adaptive Self-reflection
from Rumination
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How can people adaptively analyze and “work through” negative feelings without rumi-
nating? This paper will briefly review findings from an integrative program of research,
which suggests that a critical factor determining whether people’s attempts to adap-
tively reason about negative experiences succeed or fail is the type of self-perspective
they adopt. That is, whether people analyze their feelings from a self-immersed or
self-distanced perspective. The implications of shifting self-perspectives for subjective
experience, autonomic nervous system reactivity, and neural activity are discussed.
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Viktor Frankl, one of the great psychiatrists of
the 20th century, devoted much of his life to un-
derstanding how people can adaptively cope
with distressing life events. After enduring life
in a Holocaust concentration camp, Frankl1 de-
scribed the conditions that allowed him and his
fellow prisoners to survive as follows:
. . .Nietzche’s words, ‘He who has a why to live
for can bear with almost any how’, could be the
guiding motto for all psychotherapeutic and psy-
chohygienic efforts. . . whenever there was an op-
portunity for it, one had to give [Holocaust Con-
centration Camp Prisoners] a why – an aim – for
their lives, in order to strengthen them to bear the
terrible how of their existence. (Frankl 1959, p. 84)
Six decades have passed since Frankl first
penned these words. During this time a great
deal of evidence has accumulated to support
his thesis—self-regulatory strategies and clini-
cal interventions that lead people to reconstrue
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negative events in ways that promote mean-
ing making-that provide people with “why’s”
to explain their “how’s-have been shown to
facilitate adaptive coping across a variety of
circumstances.2–5 What has also become clear
during this time, however, is that people expe-
rience enormous difficulty doing this precisely
when it matters most—when negative feelings
are intense and people are motivated to under-
stand their feelings in order to improve them.
Rather than facilitating adaptive self-reflection,
focusing attention on one’s feelings under
such circumstances often gives rise to rumina-
tion, which serves to maintain and exacerbate
distress.6–9
Putting these findings together, a challenge
emerges: to understand why people’s attempts
to understand negative feelings at times succeed
and at other times fail. This paper will address
this issue by reviewing findings from an inte-
grative set of studies, which suggest that a criti-
cal factor distinguishing adaptive self-reflection
from dysfunctional rumination is the type of self-
perspective people adopt while analyzing negative
feelings.
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Processes Distinguishing Adaptive
and Maladaptive Self-reflection:
The Role of Self-perspective
Prior research indicates that when people
recall negative emotional events, they typi-
cally do so from a self-immersed perspective.10
From this perspective, self-relevant events and
emotions are experienced in the first person,
through one’s own eyes. However, experiences
can also be focused on from a self-distanced
perspective in which the individual becomes
an observer of the self (for example, see Refs.
11–16). In prior research, Kross, Ayduk, and
Mischel17 proposed that whether people adopt
a self-immersed versus self-distanced perspec-
tive would critically influence their ability to
analyze negative experiences adaptively. They
predicted that when individuals focus on nega-
tive feelings from a self-immersed perspective,
episodic information concerning the specific
chain of events (i.e., what happened) and emo-
tions experienced (i.e., what did I feel?) would
become accessible, serving to increase nega-
tive affect. In contrast, they predicted that an-
alyzing negative feelings from a self-distanced
perspective would lead people to focus less on
the episodic features of their recalled experi-
ence and more on reconstruing it in ways that
promote insight and closure. In turn, they pre-
dicted that this shift in the content of people’s
thoughts about their past experience—less re-
counting and more reconstruing—would lead
to reductions in negative affect.
Emotional Reactivity
and Construals
To test these predictions, Kross and col-
leagues17 recruited participants for a study on
memory and language. Participants were first
instructed to recall a specific time from their
past in which they felt overwhelming feelings of
anger and hostility. They were then randomly
assigned to analyze their feelings from either a
self-immersed or self-distanced perspective. Subse-
quently, participants rated the extent to which
they relived their negative feelings during the
experiment and described in writing the stream
of thoughts they experienced as they analyzed
their feelings. The latter thought content essays
were coded for the extent to which they con-
tained recounting statements (i.e., statements
in which participants indicated thinking about
the specific chain of events and emotions expe-
rienced) and reconstruing statements (i.e., state-
ments demonstrating insight and closure).
The results indicated that participants in
the self-distanced group displayed significantly
lower levels of emotional reactivity compared
to participants in the self-immersed group.
In addition, analyses of participants’ thought
content essays indicated that participants who
analyzed their feelings from a self-distanced
perspective focused relatively less on what hap-
pened to them (i.e., recounting) and relatively
more on reconstruing the event (e.g., I under-
stand why the fight happened; it might have been ir-
rational but I understand his motivation now). Con-
sistent with the experimenters’ predictions, this
shift in the content of people’s thoughts about
their past experience—less recounting and
more reconstruing—mediated the effect of the




The findings reviewed above suggest that di-
recting individuals to analyze negative feelings
from a self-distanced perspective helps attenu-
ate emotional reactivity in the short term. But
to what extent are these reductions in negative
affect substantively significant? One way to ad-
dress this question is to compare the effects of
self-distancing against distraction, a technique
that has been shown to be extremely effective at
reducing negative affect relative to rumination
manipulations in prior work.7 Drawing from re-
search indicating that distraction and cognitive
reconstrual strategies are equally effective at
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facilitating self-control,19–20 Kross and Ayduk21
hypothesized that self-distancing and distrac-
tion would lead to statistically equivalent reduc-
tions in negative affect. Findings from a study
that compared the effects of self-distancing,
self-immersion, and distraction on short-term
emotional reactivity were consistent with this
prediction. Whereas both distraction and self-
distancing led to significantly lower levels of
emotional reactivity relative to self-immersion,
distraction and self-distancing led to the same
relatively low levels of emotional reactivity.21
From Mind to Body: Implications
for Cardiovascular Reactivity
Another question raised by our initial find-
ings was whether these different ways of analyz-
ing negative experiences impact people on the
physiological level. Prior research indicates that
rumination delays the amount of time it takes
people to physiological recovery from negative
events because it leads people to continually re-
hash the emotionally evocative details of past
experiences.22–24 To the extent that analyzing
negative experiences from a self-distanced per-
spective attenuates rumination, we predicted
that it would influence autonomic nervous sys-
tem reactivity as well, enhancing the pace of
physiological recovery.
Ayduk and Kross25 tested this prediction by
randomly assigning participants to analyze an
anger experience from either a self-immersed
or self-distanced perspective while continuously
recording their blood pressure levels. Consis-
tent with predictions, they found that partic-
ipants in the self-distanced group displayed
significantly lower levels of blood pressure reac-
tivity (relative to baseline) compared to the self-
immersed group both during the experiment,
when participants were explicitly instructed to
analyze their feelings, and 20 min after the
experiment was over (during a recovery pe-
riod). Given the negative physical health impli-
cations associated with delayed physiological
recovery,26,27 these findings suggest that self-
distancing may have important physical health
implications.
Long-Term Buffering Effects
The findings reviewed thus far demonstrate
that self-distancing is effective at reducing emo-
tional and physiological reactivity in the short
term. But what about protective buffering ef-
fects? Does analyzing feelings from a self-
distanced perspective enable people to adap-
tively “work through” and process disturbing
experiences in ways that reduce their future
negative impact?
To address these questions Kross and Ay-
duk21 recruited participants for two short-term
longitudinal studies. During Session 1 of each
study, participants recalled a depression-related
experience and were then randomly assigned
to a self-immersion, self-distancing, or distrac-
tion condition. Participants then returned to
the laboratory either 24 h (study 1) or 7 days
(study 2) later for additional testing. During this
second session all participants recalled and an-
alyzed the same experience they thought about
during Session 1, without receiving any addi-
tional instructions regarding how they should
think about the event. They then indicated how
upset they felt and how much time they spent
thinking about their past experience between
the two sessions.
Regardless of whether the time lag between
the two sessions was 1 day or 7 days, the results
were the same-whereas both self-distancing and
distraction led to lower levels of negative affect
compared to the self-immersion strategy dur-
ing Session 1, during Session 2 self-distancing
led to the lowest levels of negative affect21 (also
see Ref. 28). Participants in the self-distancing
group also displayed the lowest levels of recur-
ring thoughts about their recalled negative ex-
periences during the time period separating the
two sessions. Taken together, these findings sug-
gest that analyzing negative experiences from
a self-distanced perspective have both adaptive
short-term and long-term implications.
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From the Laboratory to Everyday
Life: Spontaneous Self-distancing
To the extent that adopting a self-distanced
perspective aids people in their ability to
cope adaptively with trying emotional circum-
stances, one might expect some people to spon-
taneously implement this technique. Consider,
for example, a recent description of President
Barak Obama by New York Times columnist
David Brooks (2008):
When Bob Schieffer asked him tough questions
during the debate Wednesday night, he would step
back and describe the broader situation. When
John McCain would hit him with some critique
— even about fetuses being left to die on a table
— he would smile in amusement at the political
game they were playing. At every challenging mo-
ment, his instinct was to self-remove and establish
an observer’s perspective.
This passage suggests that Obama, a public
figure known at this point in time for his capac-
ity for self-control, adopts a self-distanced (i.e.,
observer) perspective to regulate his feelings—
at least in some situations. The question for
us is whether this is true of other people as
well? That is, do some people spontaneously self-
distance when analyzing negative feelings, and
does doing so lead to the same types of emo-
tion regulatory consequences as when people
are instructed to do this in the laboratory?
Ayduk and Kross29 examined these issues
by cueing participants to recall and analyze a
recent negative interpersonal experience with-
out making any reference to what type of self-
perspective they should adopt as they focused
on their feelings. Subsequently, participants
were asked to indicate the extent to which they
adopted a self-immersed versus self-distanced
perspective as they focused on their feelings us-
ing a seven-point Likert scale.
The results indicated that the more par-
ticipants spontaneously self-distanced, the less
emotional and physiological reactivity they dis-
played. In another study spontaneous self-
distancing at time 1 predicted lower levels of
emotional reactivity when participants were
asked to analyze the same event approximately
6 weeks later and was correlated with lower
levels of intrusive thoughts during the 6-week
period separating the two sessions. Thus col-
lectively, emerging findings suggest that peo-
ple do, in fact, spontaneously self-distance and
that doing so is linked with a similar pattern
of adaptive outcomes as when self-distancing is
experimentally manipulated in the laboratory.
From Mind to Brain: Neural
Signatures of Adaptive
Self-reflection
Recent work has also begun to examine
whether distinct patterns of neural activity un-
derlie these different ways of reflecting on neg-
ative past experiences. In one study, for exam-
ple, Kross, Davidson, Weber, and Ochsner30
used functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to monitor brain activity while par-
ticipants thought about intense negative au-
tobiographical experiences using strategies de-
signed to facilitate versus undermine adaptive
self-reflection. Specifically, on some trials par-
ticipants were instructed to focus concretely on
the specific episodic details surrounding their
past experiences (i.e., conceptually similar to
self-immersion). On other trials they were di-
rected to focus on their feelings as mental events
that were psychologically distanced from the
self (i.e., conceptually similar to self-distancing).
The results of this study revealed increased
levels of activity in brain regions involved in self-
referential processing (medial prefrontal cortex,
Brodmann Area 10) and emotion dysregula-
tion (subgenual anterior cingulate cortex, Brod-
mann Area 25) when participants implemented
the self-immersion strategy in comparison to
the self-distancing strategy. In addition, acti-
vity in both of these regions correlated posi-
tively with the increases in self-report negative
affect that participants reported experiencing
on self-immersion versus self-distancing trials.
The fact that activity in the subgenual an-
terior cingulate cortex (BA25) distinguished
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between these two different ways of focusing
on negative autobiographical memories in this
study was particularly noteworthy. A number
of recent studies have implicated elevated lev-
els of activity in this region in depression,31,32
a mood disorder characterized by ruminative
ideation.6,7 For example, activity in this region
is elevated among clinically depressed individu-
als at rest,33 declines in response to antidepres-
sant treatment for depression,34–36 and predicts
treatment response with cognitive behavioral
therapy.37 In addition, reducing activity in this
region via deep brain stimulation techniques
has been associated with remissions of de-
pression in previously treatment-refractory pa-
tients.38 Thus, the fact that the self-distancing
technique leads to reductions in activity in this
brain region provides an important additional
layer of evidence suggesting that this strat-
egy may be useful for buffering people against
rumination.
Concluding Comments
The main goals of this paper were to
shed light on why people’s attempts to ana-
lyze and “work through” negative feelings fail,
and to demonstrate how such failures can be
overcome-by adopting a self-distanced perspec-
tive when analyzing negative events rather than
a self-immersed perspective. Whether or not
shifting from a self-immersed to a self-distanced
perspective facilitates adaptive emotional anal-
ysis among different types of clinical popula-
tions (e.g., individuals with major depressive
disorder or anxiety disorders) or in response to
different types of negative affect-eliciting situa-
tions (the studies reviewed in this paper focused
only on anger and depression-related events)
currently remains unknown. Addressing these
questions in the future is important for building
a more integrative understanding of the pro-
cesses that underlie adaptive versus maladap-
tive forms of self-reflection.
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